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DESTABILIZED DOCTRINE AT THE END OF

THE REHNQUIST ERA AND THE BUSINESS
RELATED CASES IN ITS FINAL TERM
Barbara K. Bucholtz*
May you live in interesting times.
Unknown1

I have onefinal thought. We have become used to the idea that, in literatureand the
arts, there are alternating rhythms of classicism and romanticism. During classical
periods.., everything is neat, tidy and logical; theorists and critics reign supreme; [and]
formal rules of structure and composition are stated to the general acclaim.... But the
classical aesthetic, once it has been formulated, regularly breaks down in a protracted
romantic agony. The romantics spurn the exquisitely stated rules of the preceding
period.... At the height of a romantic period,everything is confused, sprawling,formless
and chaotic-as well as, frequently, extremely interesting. Then, the romantic energy
having spent itself there is a new classicalreformulation-andso the rhythms continue.
Perhaps we should admit the possibility of such alternatingrhythms in the process of
the law.
Grant Gilmore
I.

2

INTRODUCTION

Earlier this year, Professor Laurence Tribe wrote a letter to Justice Stephen Breyer
which stated, in part:
Dear Steve:
I appreciate your asking about the projected second volume of the third edition of
American ConstitutionalLaw. After considerable thought, I recently concluded ...that I
should suspend work on the balance of that volume ....
I've suspended work on a revision because, in area after area, we find ourselves at a
fork in the road-a point at which it's fair to say things could go in any of several

* Professor of Law, Executive Director, University of Tulsa Nonprofit Law Center, Professorial Fellow,
National Energy/Environmental Law & Policy Center.
1. See generally BBC, The Quote 'May You Live in Interesting Times,' http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/hub/
A807374 (last accessed Nov. 9, 2005) (stating the quote is not of Chinese origin as widely believed).
2. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 102-03 (Ohio State U. Press 1974).
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directions-and because conflict over basic constitutional premises is today at a fever
pitch ... with little common ground from which to build agreement.
[l]f one is aiming at [drafting a treatise] that organizes the corpus of decisional law-that
identifies, and reflects critically on, the major themes and directions of movement-then
this isn't the moment.
Happily, many of the same factors that make ours a peculiarly bad time to be going
out on a limb to propound a Grand Unified Theory-or anything close-contribute to a
ferment and excitement that make this a particularly good time, challenging and even
thrilling, to be writing about, teaching,3 briefing and arguing constitutional law-all of
which I remain enthusiastic about doing.

Professor Tribe's description of the current state of constitutional doctrine recalls
Grant Gilmore's characterization of similar eras-in law, literature, and the arts-as
"romantic" (or, in Tribe's words, conflicted but also quite thrilling). 4 For dedicated
scholars like Gilmore and Tribe, it is exciting to witness the nascent possibilities for a
renewed consensus and a broadened perspective that intellectual conflict can create.
The response of the business community to the doctrinal cacophony of a "romantic
era" in law, however, is not so sanguine. Business famously prefers stability and
predictability in its markets and in the legal framework that regulates its market activity.
A romantic era in constitutional law can have little appeal for the business community.
However, business has been thrust into the maelstrom of this romantic turn in
constitutional law. Most constitutional law and federal law cases have no direct bearing
on market activity, of course. But it is worth noting that between a third to a half of the
Court's decisions, in any given Term, are business-related; 5 and that some of the
Rehnquist Court's most divisive decisions have been directly related to business
activity. 6 Thus, the confession of a legal scholar with the credentials of Professor Tribe
that he is perplexed about the direction of American Constitutional Law gives no comfort

3. Ltr. from Laurence H. Tribe, Prof., Harv. L. Sch., to Stephen G. Breyer, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. (Apr. 29,
2005), in Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 Green Bag 3, 292-93 (2005) (emphasis in original). Also
included in Green Bag, following the letter to Justice Breyer, is Professor Tribe's "Open Letter to Interested
Readers of American Constitutional Law." Id. at 294-306. Laurence H. Tribe is the Carl M. Loeb University
Professor at Harvard Law School.
4. Nonetheless, the irony of characterizing the current era as a rebellion by a "romantic" Rehnquist Court
(with all the rule-spuming and creative self-expression that the term "romantic" seems to imply) against the
doctrines established by the "classical" Warren Court (with all the structure and rigidity that the term
"classical" seems to imply) should escape neither our attention nor our contemplation.
5. For example, in the 2000-2001 Term, thirty-six out of the seventy-nine decisions reached were
business-related, and during the Rehnquist era business-related cases represented between one-third to one-half
of the decisions rendered in a given Term.
6. See for example, College Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board,
527 U.S. 666 (1999), which made it clear that "business interests seeking redress against state action will have
significantly diminished legal territory in which to maneuver." Barbara K. Bucholtz, PrivateSector Issues in a
Public Sector Retro-lution: The Supreme Court's Business-Related Decisions in the October 1999 Term, 36
Tulsa L.J. 153, 179 (2000) [hereinafter Bucholtz, Private Sector Issues]. Florida Prepaidwas an important
case in the Court's evolving Federalism doctrine. With respect to the Rehnquist Court's bold assault on the
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), see for example, Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999), a case which limited the availability of the ADA for plaintiff-employees when it held that the threshold
standard for remedial relief under the ADA "exclude[s] impairments which, like myopia, can be corrected."
Barbara K. Bucholtz, Employment Rights and Wrongs: ADA Issues in the 2001-2002 Supreme Court Term, 38
Tulsa L. Rev. 363, 365-66 (2002) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Bucholtz, Employment Rights].
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to the business community. Nonetheless, Tribe's perspicuous account of the current
state of constitutional doctrine and federal law would be hard to refute today, 7 even
though the disarray we now witness would have been difficult to predict at the beginning
of the Rehnquist era.
The 2004-2005 Term heralds the end of the long-lived Rehnquist era of the
Supreme Court. It was an era of conflicting, and conflicted, demeanors: distinguished at
8
its inception by its moderately conservative, and with two notable exceptions,
restraintist approach. Its reputation, in the early years, as a restraintist and centrist Court
was attributable, in the first instance, to the cases it chose to consider. That is to say, it
was apparent to observers during that period that the Court evinced a distinct preference
for granting the writ of certiorari to cases that did not address divisive issues. 9 But, the
Court's early centrist approach was also reflected in its moderately conservative
doctrinal approach to the cases it did decide. In those early years, it appeared that the
Court intended, for the most part, to retain established liberal precedent. 10 Furthermore,
not only did the Court select relatively non-divisive issues for review, but it also
addressed those issues in the most restrained manner: "by rigorous textual analysis rather

7. The current tenor of doctrinal disarray in constitutional law reflects a destabilizing ideological divide in
the polity generally. For the perspective of another perplexed and eminent legal scholar, see Richard H. Pildes,
Foreword: The Constitutionalizationof DemocraticPolitics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 31, 39 (2004) (arguing that
we are engaged in a "transformation in constitutional law" that "lacks a general structure that would properly
organize the emerging 'law of politics.').
8. (Then) Justice Rehnquist's earliest forays into activism were limited to restricting the rights of criminal
defendants. See e.g. Ill. v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983) (per curiam) (reversing a state court decision
premised on Fourth Amendment protections); Ill. v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (reversing a state court
ruling on warrantless searches and ruling in favor of the prosecution); Ill. v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)
(revising a state court ruling on inventory searches and holding for the prosecution). For a thorough discussion
of the Rehnquist Court's dismantling of Warren Court doctrine establishing "a minimum level of protection for
all criminal defendants below which neither state nor federal courts may venture," see Timothy P. O'Neill,
"Stop Me Before I Get Reversed Again ": The Failureof Illinois Appellate Courts To Protect Their Criminal
Decisionsfrom United States Supreme Court Review, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 893, 895, 912 n. 121 (2005). For a
review of recent Supreme Court decisions implicating constitutional rights of criminal defendants, see Stanley
E. Adelman, Safe at Home, but Better Buckle Up on the Road-Supreme Court Search and Seizure Decisions,
2000-2001 Term, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 347 (2001). Clearly, the Rehnquist Court has made significant
encroachments on Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), as well as the progeny of that case and its protective
shield, the exclusionary rule. See e.g. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing a "reasonable reliance"
exception to the rule which presaged this "good faith" exception). The other focus of (then) Justice
Rehnquist's early activism was securities law plaintiffs. See e.g. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). These early examples of Rehnquist
activism have endured. His early efforts are now settled law and have had the effect of narrowing the rights of
criminal defendants and of investor plaintiffs.
9. Professor Doug Kmiec, for example, once remarked:
"What better way to manifest a narrower, more constrained role for the judiciary than to select cases
inscrutable [and uninteresting] to the general public? ...In a way, it's saying if you really think
this is the least dangerous branch of government, then it should play its role with a decidedly lower
profile than the selected branches, and so it will confine itself to clarifying difficulties in statutory
enactments ....
"
Barbara K. Bucholtz, Business as Usual in a "DollarDemocracy ": A Review ofBusiness-Related Cases in the
1998-1999 Supreme Court Term, 35 Tulsa L.J. 485, 486 n. 4 (2000) (ellipses in original); see also Barbara K.
Bucholtz, Taking Care of Business: A Review of Business-Related Cases in the 1995-1996 Supreme Court
Term, 32 Tulsa L.J. 449, 452 ("In the long run, a retrospective of the business-related cases the Court chose to
reject may be the best mechanism for [evaluating it].").
10. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Sticking To Business: A Review of Business-Related Cases in the 1997-98
Supreme Court Term, 34 Tulsa L.J. 207, 208 (1999) [hereinafter Bucholtz, Sticking to Business].
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than by reference to broad policy considerations."" In sum, the early Rehnquist Court
acquired a reputation as a moderately conservative, centrist Court 12with "a very real
preoccupation with forming and maintaining a stabilizing consensus."'
But a radical metamorphosis began to take shape in 1992 and finally emerged by
the 1996-1997 Term as a "full-fledged revisionist federalism. The-seminal Federalism
cases, now recognized as a defining feature of Rehnquist jurisprudence, also opened up a
clear ideological fault line that the Court previously appeared at pains to avoid." 13 At
the same time, the three indicia by which the Court had been deemed "moderate" began
to take on a new cast and hue. The same Court that once eschewed broad policy
considerations and divisive political issues seemed to reach for them, in the cases it
selected for review. 14 Further, the decisions rendered in those cases presented a frontal
challenge to the Warren Court's doctrinal approach, especially with regard to the
boundaries of federal-state jurisdiction. 15 Cases were, in contradistinction from the early
16
era, decided on the broadest Constitutional and the most divisive policy grounds.
Finally, textual interpretation became not a device for maintaining a restraintist posture
with regard to federal legislation, but an effective tool for advancing broad policy goals
under a restraintist guise. 17 What emerged was an activist majority with a clear
conservative agenda to roll back and replace what it considered to be distinctly liberal
doctrine. And federalism seemed to be the first priority among several candidates for
doctrinal reversal on the majority's conservative agenda. Clearly, the construction of a
conservative doctrinal edifice upon the ruins and remains of its liberal predecessor was in
process--or was it?

11. Barbara K. Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme Court and the Business-Related Cases on
its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 305, 306 [hereinafter Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips].
12. Bucholtz, Sticking to Business, supra n. 10, at 227.
13. Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips, supra n. 11, at 306 (footnotes omitted). At that juncture, it appeared the
Federalism cases would consistently be won by the slimmest of majorities and pluralities: Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. See e.g. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706 (1999);
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 666. A 1992 case that was a harbinger of the Court's emergent states' rights
proclivities was N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding the Federal Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 unconstitutionally forced states into administering a federal program).
14. By the mid-1990s the Court's preference for policy redefinition was apparent by its selection of, and
decisions in, for example, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that interim background
checking procedures imposed on state law enforcement officers by the Brady Act constituted an
unconstitutional exercise of federal power over state officials not authorized by the Necessary and Proper
Clause or by the Commerce Clause), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the federal
Religious Restoration Act exceeded Congressional Power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), and
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding Congress had no authority under the
Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private suits in federal courts).
15. See Printz, 521 U.S. 898; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507; Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. 44.
16. See e.g. Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism andthe CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1373 (1998) (extolling the virtues of this unabashed radicalism and locating its doctrinal roots, not in
anti-federalist precepts, but in pre-1937 case law); accord Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's
Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 201 (2000) (noting that the
Rehnquistian Revolution could have been predicted by the strong states' rights proclivities of (then) Justice
Rehnquist in his first two terms); see also Bucholtz, Private Sector Issues, supra n. 6.
17. One of the most dramatic instances of this approach is to be found in the several decisions in which the
Court has addressed (and narrowed) coverage of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bucholtz,
Employment Rights, supra n. 6, at 363 (arguing that "[s]tatutory construction, considered the most technical,
neutral, and deferential ground for interpreting and applying law [became] an effective vehicle for the Court's
conservative activism and a subtle method for advancing its conservative agenda").
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Just as we had braced ourselves for a forthrightly activist Court with a clear
revisionist agenda, the Court seemed to metamorphose once again. The exemplar of this
18
new turn was the Court's "gestalt flip" on the federalism issue in Bush v. Gore.
Rehnquistian doctrine in this third configuration seemed conflicted and elusive. While
the Court maintained an activist posture, its activism lacked the doctrinal rigor we might
have anticipated. Increasingly it was "activist," not in the sense of doctrine-building, but
rather in the sense of result-oriented. As a consequence, in case after case, emergent
doctrine failed to cohere, and the interpretive rules adopted to construe extant law
seemed internally inconsistent. It became difficult-in any number of arenas-to tell
what doctrine was being constructed, and what doctrine was being deconstructed. In this
third, and final, phase of the Rehnquist era it has, indeed (as Professor Tribe suggested),
become difficult to see where we are going. While the Court's legacy will undoubtedly
include its successes in dismantling some of the Warren Court's oeuvre, it is unclear how
much of its own work will survive and develop.
Interestingly, a notable constant in the Court's approach throughout all three of its
doctrinal configurations is that it began, and has remained, a moderately pro-business
Court. With few exceptions, no radical changes were wrought in most business-related
law. This relative stability, even at the cost of a more strenuously pro-business approach,
is surely reassuring to the business community despite that the broader doctrinal milieu
in which these decisions reside is discomfiting. The last Supreme Court Term illustrates
the point. High profile decisions by the Court, which indirectly impact business, seemed
destabilizing; decisions more directly related to the business community were
moderately pro-business.
II.

A.

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ISSUES

Anti-DiscriminationLaws
1.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 199019

One hallmark of the Rehnquist Court was its use of statutory interpretation over a
period of several years to curtail workers' statutorily protected rights, especially those

18. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,531 U.S. 70 (2000), the United
States Supreme Court remanded for clarification and explanation the Florida Supreme Court's decision to
extend, by twelve days, the deadline to certify the Florida vote in the 2000 Presidential election. When the
Florida Supreme Court ordered a recount of ballots statewide, the Bush Campaign appealed the order. Palm
Beach County, 531 U.S. at 73. In Bush v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the recount order of the
highest court in Florida did not secure adequate Fourteenth Amendment equal protection to Bush, and there
was no time to correct the problem. 531 U.S. at 103; see Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips, supra n. I I (arguing that by
pro-actively asserting a problematic use of the federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment in contravention
of a reasonable -interpretation of applicable state law by the highest court in the state, the Rehnquist Court
seemed to contradict and, thus, compromise its nascent states' rights federalism). As it turned out, Bush v.
Gore was a harbinger of the Court's abrupt shift from doctrine-building to result-driven decisions. This shift
called into question the Court's claim to principled decision-making and it undercut the development of its own
doctrine. See Bucholtz, Employment Rights, supra n. 6 (asserting that the Court's decisions seem increasingly
driven by outcome rather than by doctrine).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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granted pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 20 From 1998 through
2002, the Court consistently narrowed coverage of the ADA by a restrictive reading of
its provisions. 2 1 The ADA case on the Court's docket last Term can be viewed as an end
to, if not a reversal of, that trend. In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.22 a divided
Court held that title III of the ADA covers a cruise ship line operating ships under
23
foreign flags, so long as it does not conflict with principles of international law.
Justice Kennedy, who authored the opinion, stated that the ADA "prohibits
discrimination against the disabled in the full and equal enjoyment of public
accommodations, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), and public transportation services,
§ 12184(a)",24 and that "there can be no serious doubt that the ... cruise ships in question
fall within... the statutory definitions of 'public accommodation' and 'specified public
transportation' . . . under conventional principles of interpretation. ' ' 25 This liberal
interpretation of the Act's coverage stands in stark contrast to the Court's earlier ADA
decisions where the majority was at pains to parse the statute so as to restrict its
coverage. 26 The Court also broadened coverage of the ADA in another case, Tennessee
v. Lane,27 when it held that states have an obligation, under the ADA, to make their
courthouses wheelchair accessible. 28 The case is surprising in two respects: (1) it
broadens ADA coverage, and (2) it refuses to recognize the case as one which implicates
the states' immunity from federal law. Both of these aspects of Spector are in
contravention of the Court's earlier proclivities. It remains to be seen, however, whether
a citizen's ADA rights against state discrimination go beyond the courthouse.
2.

29
Age Discrimination in Employment Act

In Smith v. City of Jackson a unanimous Court held that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA") authorizes disparate-impact claims, thus allowing a
colorable claim brought by older police and public safety officers alleging the City's
salary increase package had a disparate impact on them. 3 1 Nonetheless, the City

20. For a discussion of the Court's Rehnquistian ADA decisions, see Bucholtz, Employment Rights,
supra n. 6. Covered in some detail in that article are a number of decisions discussing various employment
issues. The ADA cases of that term were: Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc.
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). Early ADA precedents of the Rehnquist Court are also discussed in the
article: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); Buckhannon Bd. & CareHome, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of
Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Bd of Trustees of the U of Ala. v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356
(2001); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. UnitedParcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S.
516 (1999); Sutton, 527 U.S. 471; Cleveland v. Policy Mgt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999); Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). See also Bucholtz, Employment Rights, supra n. 6.
21. For the cases included in this effort, see supra n. 20.
22. 125 S. Ct. 2169 (2005).
23. Id. at 2184.
24. Id. at 2176.
25. Id. at 2177.
26. See supra n. 20 (listing cases limiting the reach of the ADA).
27. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
28. See id at 533-34.
29. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
30. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
31. Id. at 1539-40.
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proffered evidence that the disparate treatment of the pay plan was "'based on reasonable
33
32
a permissible exception under the statute.
factors other than age discrimination,'
The case, however, established the right to proceed on a disparate-impact
claim under the
34
ADEA, a broader reading of the statute than that of the lower courts.
But the Court, narrowed coverage of the ADEA in General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc. v. Cline35 when it refused to recognize a "reverse discrimination" claim by

younger workers of a corporation who alleged that the corporation's collective
bargaining agreement with the union impermissibly eliminated health benefit coverage
for retirees, except for those current employers who were at least fifty years old. 36 The
Court held that the ADEA did not cover younger employees.
3.

37

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196438

In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,39 Justice Ginsberg, writing for an
eight-to-one majority, clarified the standards for finding a constructive discharge under
Title VII. 40 She explained that while an employer can defend a claim by demonstrating
that it had instituted adequate anti-discriminatory policies and procedures, that defense
41
may be rebutted by a showing of specific official harassment, in a particular case.
A relatively pro-employee decision, but it does little to change Title VII jurisprudence.
B.

Other Statutes

A unanimous Court in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co. 4 2 ruled that a dredge is a
44
"vessel" 4 3 for purposes of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act;
therefore an injured marine engineer was entitled to recover on a negligence suit against
his employer when its dredge collided with another vessel. 45 This is obviously an
employee-friendly suit which expands the coverage of the Act; however, its applicability
is extremely narrow.
In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila4 6 the Court unanimously held that Congressional
authority to enact a "patients bill of rights" trumps states' authority to provide patients
with a right to sue health management organizations that refuse to cover "medically
necessary" treatments. 4 7 This case stands as an anomaly to the Court's earlier federalism

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1543 (quoting Pub. L. No. 20-202, § 4, 81 Stat. 603 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(a))).
Id. at 1543-44.
Id. at 1539-40.
540 U.S. 581 (2004).
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at. 583.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
542 U.S. 129 (2004).
Id. at 133-34.
Id. at 134.
125 S. Ct. 1118 (2005).
Id. at 1121.
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2000).
Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1121-23, 1129.
542 U.S. 200 (2004).
Id. at 204.
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doctrine and it is one, among several cases last Term, that have been criticized for
favoring the federal government's right to regulate at the expense of state law claims
protecting individual rights. 48 Here, federal authority preempted state negligence claims.

Il1.

TAXATION

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks4 9 raised the issue of whether a
successful litigant's taxable litigation settlement proceeds included contingent fees paid
to his or her attorneys.
In holding that they did, the Court analyzed the issue under the
"anticipatory assignment doctrine," 5 1 finding that because the litigant-taxpayer retained
"dominion over the income-generating asset" 52 (i.e., the lawsuit), if not "dominion over
the income at the moment of receipt" 53 (i.e., the contingent fee), the contingent fee was
54
taxable income for the taxpayer.
In reversing a twenty-year practice of the Tax Court to withhold the special trial
judge report from the public and from the record on appeal, the Court held, in Ballardv.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 55 that the practice violated the Tax Court's own
Rules 56 as well as "generally prevailing practice" 57 in federal civil and bankruptcy
58
courts.
Grable & Sons Metal Products,Inc. v. Darue Engineering& Manufacturing59 was
a quiet title action by a taxpayer against the tax sale purchaser asserting that the Internal
Revenue Service failed to give the taxpayer adequate notice of the sale. 60 The issue on
appeal was whether the case was removable to federal court. 61 Because the suit
presented a federal question, 62 and because federal tax litigation implicates a national
63
interest, the Court held that it was.
IV.

PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW

The case of Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.64 called for an
interpretation of the safe harbor exemption of patent protection found at section 271 of

48. See e.g. infra nn. 174-187 and accompanying text.
49, 125 S.Ct. 826 (2005).
50. Id. at 828-29.
51. Id. at 831 ("A taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from gross income by assigning the gain in
advance to another party." (citing Commr. of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Helvering v.
Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930))).
52. Id. at 832.
53. Id. at 831.
54. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 831-32.
55. 125 S. Ct. 1270, 1283 (2005).
56. Id. at 1282.
57. Id. at 1284.
58. Id.
59. 125 S.Ct. 2363 (2005).
60. Id. at 2365-66.
61. Id. at 2365.
62. Id. at 2367.
63. Id. at 2365.
64. 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
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the patent statute. 65 The case involved the use of patented components in preclinical
studies covered by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 66 The Court
ruled that the FDCA studies were covered by the section 271 exemption, and it remanded
67
the case for further proceedings.
Whether peer-to-peer file sharing software constitutes copyright infringement was
at issue in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.6 8 Justice Souter writing
for a unanimous Court, with concurrences, held that where the apparent reason for
distribution of a product is to promote copyright infringement, then the distributor is
69
liable pursuant to the provisions of title 35, section 271(c) of the United States Code.
V.

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

Two cases in the last term implicated federal securities laws. The accounting firm,
Arthur Andersen L.L.P., was convicted of obstructing justice in the Securities and
Exchange Commission's investigation of the Enron debacle because Arthur Andersen
instructed its employees to shred documents relevant to the investigation.
The issue

71
before the Court in the well-publicized case of Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States
was whether the jury instructions explaining the obstruction of justice statute 72 properly
conveyed its meaning. 7 3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that they
did not in two critical respects: first, they failed adequately to illuminate the intent
element of the statute, and, second, they failed to explain the requisite nexus between the
impermissible act of obstruction and any particular legal proceedings (here, that the
alleged directive to shred in anticipation of the investigation). 74 Therefore, the case was
reversed and remanded.7 5
The second securities law case was brought under the Securities Exchange Act of

1934. 76 The Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari in Dura Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Broudo77 to resolve a split in the circuits about the proof of loss (i.e., "loss
causation") 78 in section 10(b) 79 cases alleging material misrepresentations. 8° In Dura
Pharmaceuticals,investors argued that false statements given by Dura to the Food and

65. Id. at 2376 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) (2000)).
66. Id. at 2377 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000)).
67. Id. at 2383-84.
68. 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
69. Id. at 2770, 2777.
70. See ArthurAndersen LLP v. U.S., 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2131 (2005).
71. 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005).
72. Id. at 2131 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A), (B) (2000)).
73. Id.at2131-32.
74. ld.at 2131,2136.
75. Id. at2137.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000).
77. 125 S.Ct. 1627 (2005).
78. Id. at 1630.
79. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 proscribes deception in the sale of securities, see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000), and Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated by the Commission pursuant to the statute
prohibits an "'untrue statement of material fact"' or its omission in connection therewith. Id. at 1631 (quoting
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2004)).
80. Id. at 1629-30.
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Drug Administration, in connection with the agency's approval of Dura's new asthmatic
spray device, raised the price of its stock artificially and consequently caused investors to
pay an artificially inflated price. 8 1 Following (then) Justice Rehnquist's early, but
enduringly restrictive, reading of Rule 1Ob-5 in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,82 the Court decided that the83tale of deceit reported by the investors failed both to
allege, and to prove, a lob-5 claim.
VI.

FEDERAL LAW RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.84 proves, once again, that no good
deed goes unpunished. The case was brought under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 85 The issue before the Court
was whether a purchaser of an aircraft engine maintenance company could recover the
costs it incurred in voluntarily cleaning up four sites contaminated with hazardous
substances by the seller. 86 The Court ruled that the voluntary nature of a purchaser's
actions precluded its claim for contribution or indemnification under CERCLA. 87 Only
where the purchaser (i.e., a "potentially responsible person ' 88 as defined by CERCLA)
has been sued under CERCLA, may it seek contribution for its liability exposure from
89
another party.
90
A dispute over title to submerged lands was resolved in Alaska v. United States.
The Court recognized that "States [hold presumptive] title to submerged lands beneath
inland navigable waters within their boundaries and beneath territorial waters within
three nautical miles of their coasts." 9 1 The presumption arises from the "equal footing
doctrine" 92 and from provisions in the Submerged Lands Act. 93 However, the federal
government can rebut the presumption by showing it expressly reserved the submerged
94
lands at issue by demonstrating an intent to retain them when statehood was granted.
95
The Alaska Statehood Act sufficiently demonstrated that intent.

81. Id. at 1630.
82. 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
83. DuraPharm.,125 S. Ct. at 1629; id.
at 1632 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 95 S.Ct. 1917).
84. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
85. Id. at 160-61 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)).
86. Id. at 160-62.
87. Id. at 164-65.
88. Id. at 161.
89. CooperIndus., 543 U.S. at 165.
90. 125 S.Ct. 2137 (2005).
91. Id. at2143.
92. Id. (declaring that all states enter the Union on an equal basis with the thirteen original Colonies).
93. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356a (2000)).
94. Id. at 2144.
95. Ala., 125 S.Ct. at 2144-61; see also e.g. U.S. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
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COMMUNICATION: COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH,
TRUTH IN LENDING LAWS, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

A.

Compelled CommercialSpeech

A tenacious and recurring issue on the Court's docket during the Rehnquist era
concerned mandatory contributions to generic trade advertising projects. 96 Last Term
the Court considered the issue in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn.9 7 where it was
presented with something of a new variation on the theme. In Johanns, the Court
decided for the first time whether a "government-compelled subsidy of the government's
own speech ' ' 9 8 violates the First Amendment.9 9 The case challenged the right of the
100
federal government, under the provisions of the Beef Promotion and Research Act
that established a federal marketing and promotion program of "beef and beef
' 10 2
1
products," 10 to be funded by an assessment upon "cattle sales and importation."
Noting that both compelled speech and compelled subsidy precedents have routinely
distinguished compelled support for government from compelled support for private
association, 10 3 the Court concluded that this was an example of the former instance,
more in the nature of a tax, which may be imposed without taxpayers' consent, than of a
104
free speech issue, which implicates the First Amendment.
B.

Truth in Lending Laws

Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh10 5 called upon the Court for an
interpretation of the civil liability provision of the federal Truth in Lending Act
("TILA"),' °6 which authorizes both a floor and a ceiling for an award of damages for
violations of the Act. 107 The Court found that the liability provision at subsection (i) of
the Act extends only to loans collateralized by personal property and to consumer
leases. 108

96. See Johannsv. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2058 (2005) (stating the case was the "third time
in eight years" the Court has considered similar issues).
97. 125 S.Ct. 2055, 2060 (2005).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2058 (citing 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2911 (2000)). The case also implicated "Beef Order" regulations
promulgated under the Act, at 7 C.F.R. § 1260.172(a)(5) (2004). Id.
101. Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2058 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2901(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2901(b)).
103. Id. at 2061-62.
104. Id.
105. 543 U.S. 50 (2004).
106. Id. at 50-52 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000)).
107. Id. at 58-59 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i)).
108. Id. at 58-63. That is, when Congress revised the Act by adding a subsection (iii) of section
1640(a)(2)(A) to the Act, the Congress did not intend "to alter the [well-established] meaning of
clause (i) .... [Rather, by] adding clause (iii), Congress sought to provide increasedrecovery when a TILA
violation occurs in the context of a loan secured by real property." Id. at 63 (emphasis in original). Statutorily
mandated recovery when the violation involves personal property remains unchanged. Koons Buick Pontiac
GMC, Inc., 543 U.S. at 63-64.
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Telecommunications

Justice Thomas wrote the six-to-three majority opinion in National Cable and
Telecommunications Assn. v. BrandX Internet Services. 109 The case called for a reprise
of Chevron's1l° framework for deference to agency interpretation and the mandates of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").11
At issue was the Federal
Communications Commission's conclusion that cable companies "that sell broadband
Internet service do not provide 'telecommunications servic[e]' as [title II of] the
Communications Act defines that term, and hence are exempt from mandatory
common-carrier regulation under Title II. '' 112 The majority held that, under Chevron and
APA standards, the Commission's ruling was a permissible interpretation of the
Communications Act. 113 Therefore it was entitled to the Court's deference. 114 The
unusual split of the Justices in the case is notable. The Chief Justice and Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer joined the Thomas opinion (Justices Stevens
and Breyer filed concurrences); while Justice Scalia filed a dissent, joined by Justices
Souter and Ginsburg. 115 Justice Scalia declaimed that the Commission's interpretation
evinced an agency attempt "to establish a whole new regime of non-regulation, which
will make for more or less free-market competition."1 16 He added that the "Commission
has chosen to achieve this through an implausible reading of the statute ...thus
exceed[ing] the authority given it by Congress."' 117 Scalia also declared that the majority
opinion was a continuation of the "administrative-law improvisation project it began four
' 119

118
years ago in United States v. Mead Corp." -a

case, he said, "drastically limited"

the kinds of agency ruling entitled to deference. 12 Justice Breyer's concurrence refused
to give Scalia the last word. Breyer pointed out that, in his opinion, Scalia's critique of
the Mead approach was misplaced because the majority in Mead stood for the opposite
proposition, i.e., that any "indication of.. . congressional intent"' 12 1 triggers Chevron
deference. 122 It was Scalia's dissent in Mead that called for a narrowing of Chevron
deference, said Breyer.123 Thus, in this interesting case, Stevens, Breyer, and the "swing
Justices" (Kennedy and O'Connor) joined part of the conservative block, while Souter
and Ginsburg joined Scalia. And Scalia, arguably, disagreed with himself. The
significance of the case for business interests is that, in a narrow arena, this unusual

109. 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
110. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
111. National Cable, 125 S. Ct. at 2695 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 555-561 (2000)).
112. Id. at 2695 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000)) (first bracket in original).
113. Seeid. at2711-12.
114. See id. at 2712.
115. Id. at2693.
116. NationalCable, 125 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2178 (citing 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. NationalCable, 125 S. Ct. at 2712 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 227) (emphasis
in original).
122. Id.
123. Id. at2712-13.
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majority affirmed an anti-regulatory ruling by a regulatory agency. No wonder Professor
Tribe sees multiple possibilities for Constitutional jurisprudence.
The other telecommunications case was City of Rancho Palos Verdes v.
Abrams.12 4 There, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 125 concluded that even
assuming, arguendo, that section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 126 creates an individual right against certain local government impediments to
installation of facilities for wireless communications (like antenna towers), 127 Congress
did not intend this statutory right to create a remedy under title 42, section 1983 of the
U.S. Code. 128 Justice Scalia reached his conclusion by noting that section 332 does
specify a remedy for its violation and by applying the maxim for statutory construction,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.129 Applied here, the maxim can be interpreted to
say that "[t]he express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests
that Congress intended to preclude others." 130 Both telecommunications cases this Term
reached moderately pro-business decisions through ostensibly traditional conventions of
statutory construction.
VIII. CONTRACTS

There are two contracts law cases from the last Term and, in each of them, third
parties attempted to cast themselves as intended beneficiaries of the contracts at issue. In
132
Orff v. United States, 13 1 a unanimous Court ruled that the Reclamation Reform Act
did not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity and, therefore, barred a
claim that farmers were intended third-party beneficiaries of the government's contract
with a California water district. 133 In so ruling, the Court distinguished this situation
from joinder of the federal government as a necessary party defendant in a suit between
other parties, where joinder is required "to permit a complete adjudication of rights under
' 134
a reclamation contract."
Two bills of lading were found to be maritime contracts and, therefore, subject to
federal court interpretation in Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 135 despite that the
ultimate destination of the shipment was inland (at Huntsville, Alabama). 136 Noting that
the nature of the contract (whether it contemplates a maritime transaction), not the locale
of the performance (whether at sea or on land) giving rise to the dispute, determines its

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
marks
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

125 S. Ct. 1453 (2005).
Id. at 1455. Justices Stevens and Breyer filed concurring opinions. Id.
Id. at 1458 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2000)).
Id.
Id.
Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1458.
Id. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001)) (bracket in original, internal quotation
omitted).
125 S. Ct. 2606 (2005).
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982,43 U.S.C. § 390uu (2000).
Orff, 125 S. Ct. at 2611.
Id.
125 S.Ct. 385, 388 (2004).
Id. at 389.
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maritime status for purposes of federal question jurisdiction (here, admiralty law),137 and
that the particular issues in this case require uniformity, 138 the Court concluded that it
had jurisdiction to reach the substantive issue: whether the limitations on liability clause
in the first bill of lading applied to the sub-subcontractor (Norfolk Railway) of the
shipper. 139 Applying relevant provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 14 the
Court ruled that Norfolk was an intended beneficiary of, and therefore was covered by,
the limitations of liability provision. 141 The dispute concerning the second bill of lading
raised a Hadley v. Baxendale142 question of foreseeable damages and whether the owner
of the goods was bound by the limitation of liabilities clause negotiated between the
original shipper and a subsequent carrier. 143 In holding that it was, the Court explained
that because the subsequent inland carrier (Norfolk) must have been contemplated by the
original shipper and the cargo owner, Norfolk was protected by the second bill, as well,
and the cargo owner had a claim against the original shipper for any discrepancies
144
between the terms of the first bill and the second bill.
IX.

FEDERAL PRACTICE

While Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.145 raised substantive
issues about the alleged breach of a joint venture agreement, the Court was asked to
address a procedural issue in the case about concurrent federal jurisdiction. 146 Here, the
Saudi company filed a state court declaratory judgment action two weeks before Exxon
Mobil and its subsidiaries filed suit in federal court. 14 7 The state court action was
resolved first and the question was whether the federal action must be dismissed because
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 148 the issues had already been litigated. Noting that
the doctrine has rarely been invoked by the Supreme Court, 149 Justice Ginsburg ruled
that the doctrine applies only to cases brought by losing parties in state court where the
losing parties ask federal courts to overrule the state court decisions. 150 Hence it had no
application to this concurrent jurisdiction case, in which the disposition of the federal

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.at 394-95.
See id.at 395-96.
See id. at 396-97.
46 U.S.C. app. § 1303 (2000).
NorfolkS. Ry. Co., 125 S. Ct. at 398.
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 125 S. Ct. at 398 (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145).
Id. at 399-400.
125 S. Ct. 1517 (2005).
Id. at 1521.
Id. at 1525.
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923), the Court held that a concurrent federal court

suit-alleging the state court action was erroneous-cannot be used to challenge the ruling of a state court
decision. "Federal district courts, the Rooker Court recognized, lacked the requisite appellate authority, for
their jurisdiction was 'strictly original."' Saudi Basic, 125 S. Ct. at 1522 (quoting Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416).
In Districtof Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 463 (1983), a District of Columbia

decision was challenged in a suit brought in the federal court for the District. Again, the Court held that federal
courts (with the exception of the U.S. Supreme Court) cannot act as appellate courts for state (and District of
Columbia) court decisions. Saudi Basic, 125 S. Ct. at 1523 (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486).
149. See Saudi Basic, 125 S. Ct. at 1521.

150. Id. at 1521-22.
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action would be "governed by preclusion law [pursuant to the] Full Faith and Credit
Act."'1 51 That Act would give preclusive effect to the state court judgment but would
52
permit the federal case to proceed on any independent claims it alleged.'
The other major federal practice case last Term also featured Exxon Mobil as a
named party. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. 153 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, held that
where the other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in the
action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement [of title 28, section 1332(a) of the
U.S. Code diversity jurisdiction], § 1367 [of title 28 of the U.S. Code] does authorize
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the [case] even if those
claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount specified in [section 13321.154
Justice Breyer joined a dissent filed by Justice Stevens. 155 Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
and Breyer joined a dissent filed by Justice Ginsburg. 156 The dissenters view was that
the majority's interpretation of the intent and scope of the supplemental jurisdiction
statute (section 1367(a)) was unsupportably broad and unnecessarily "disruptive of our
jurisprudence." 157 The dissenters agreed that a narrower reading of the statute, that the
district court must "first have 'original jurisdiction' over a 'civil action' before
supplemental jurisdiction can attach," 158 is a better rendering of the text.' 5 9 That
interpretation of the statute is also buttressed by "the historical and legal context of
Congress' enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute ... and it follows the sound
counsel that 'close questions of [statutory] construction should be resolved in favor of
continuity and against change."' 1 60 As Justice Ginsburg demonstrated, section 1367 has
been considered basically "a codification" 16 1 of the "judicially developed doctrines of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,"]16 2 "placing them under a single heading, but largely
retaining their substance .... Supplemental jurisdiction, once the district court has
original jurisdiction, would now include 'claims that involve the joinder or intervention
of additional parties."'163 The majority opinion "discard[s] entirely"'164 the view that the
supplemental jurisdiction statute codifies pendent and ancillary jurisdiction along with
the important cases developing this traditional view, Justice Ginsburg noted. 165 As

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1527 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000)).
Id.
125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
Id. at 2615.

155. Id. at 2614.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
158. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. at 2632 (Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2640-41 (quoting David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 925 (1992)) (bracket in original).

161. Id. at 2638.
162. Id. at 2639 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. at 2638 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000)).
164. Id.
165. Id. The majority ruled that section 1367 overruled two cases pivotal to the traditional rendition of
supplemental jurisdiction: Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939) ("[W]hen federal-court jurisdiction is
predicated on a specified amount in controversy, each plaintiff joined in the litigation must independently meet
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Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, Justice Ginsburg's interpretation of section
1367 is also buttressed by its legislative history, and he included a quote from the
applicable House Report (later adopted by the Senate), which preceded the statute's
enactment, that "' [i]n diversity cases, the district courts may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, except when doing so would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of the diversity statute."' 166 This "uncommonly clear" 167 legislative
history lends additional credence to Ginsburg's lucid rendering of the text and is a
persuasive account of its jurisprudential context, Stevens opined.168 Stevens was-to
understate the matter-not persuaded by the majority's declaration that the statute
unambiguously commanded the textual reading given by the majority. 169 Stevens
counseled that it behooves judges to take a more inclusive approach to statutory
construction: "Indeed, I believe that we as judges are more, rather than less, constrained
170
when we make ourselves accountable to all reliable evidence of legislative intent."'
The split between the "liberal," broad reading of the statute given by the
"conservative" Justices in the majority, juxtaposed against the constrained and narrow
interpretation presented by the more liberal wing of the Court, calls to mind the insights
of Grant Gilmore regarding "romantic" and "classical" forces within our jurisprudence
and suggests a paradoxical irony. 171 It is not too much to predict that the majority's
broad reading will meet the fate of Finley v. United States, 172 the case that inspired
173
passage of section 1367 and was overruled by it.
X.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Undoubtedly, other articles in this law review symposium will give focused
attention to the cases raising constitutional issues during the Supreme Court's 20042005 Term. Here, they are included as "business-related" cases.
A.

Commerce Clause

A state law prohibiting out-of-state wineries from shipping wine to in-state
consumers, while allowing in-state wineries to do so brought a Commerce Clause
challenge to the Supreme Court in Granholm v. Heald.17 4 The majority ruled the state

the jurisdictional amount requirement."); Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (each
member of the class in a class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount). Id. at 2631.
166. Id. at 2628 (quoting H.R. Rep. 101-734 (Sept. 10, 1990)) (Stevens & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
167. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2628 (citing Koons Buick PontiacGMC, Inc., 543 U.S. at 54 n. 1) (emphasis in original). For an
account of the vagaries of the interpretive maxims, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, Rules, Principles,or Just Words?
The Interpretive Project and the Problem ofLegitimacy, 11 Tex. Wes. L. Rev. 377 (2005).
171. See supra n. 2 and accompanying text.
172. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Finley was a case about federal question jurisdiction, not directly relevant to the
instant case.
173. With regard thereto, Justice Ginsburg wrote: "Section 1367, all agree, was designed to overturn this
Court's decision in Finley v. United States." Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. at 2631 (Ginsburg, Stevens,
O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
174. 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
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law was impermissibly discriminatory under Commerce Clause jurisprudence; 175 further
the law was not protected by the Twenty-first Amendment. 176 The dissenting
opinions 177 found that the majority opinion by-passed traditional approaches to dormant
Commerce

Clause

analysis; 17 8 the legislative history of the Amendment; 1 7 9

the

applicable statute and the Webb-Kenyon Act, 1 8 0 all of which are conclusive evidence
that the Amendment "was intended to return 'absolute control' of liquor traffic to the
States, free of all restrictions which the Commerce Clause might before that time have

imposed."' 18 1 Without a whisper of federalism concerns or the demands of originalism,

Justice Kennedy, joined, notably by Justice Scalia, and also by Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, 182 justified the ruling on the basis of longstanding precedent; 18

its

interpretation of Webb-Kenyon as "[empowering states] to forbid shipments of alcohol
to consumers for personal use, provided that the States treated in-state and out-of-state
liquor on the same terms"; 1 8 4 and recent cases that limit the reach of the Twenty-first

Amendment by concluding that "state laws that violate other provisions of the
Constitution are not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment."' 18 5 It is hard to avoid the

conclusion that the majority is simply narrowing the originally intended reach of the
Amendment in light of modem practice and commerce.
In Gonzales v. Raich,1 8 6 Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion holding that

Congress, under the Commerce Clause, has authority to prohibit the interstate,
non-commercial cultivation and use of marijuana for medical purposes, even if it is in

175. Id. at 1897 ("We have no difficulty concluding that New York, like Michigan, discriminates against
interstate commerce through its direct-shipping laws .... State laws that discriminate against interstate
commerce face a virtually per se rule of invalidity." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
176. Id. at 1904 ("The central purpose of the [Amendment] was not to empower States to favor local liquor
industries by erecting barriers to competition." (internal quotation marks omitted, bracket in original)).
177. Dissents were filed by Justice Stevens (joined by Justice O'Connor) and Justice Thomas (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens and O'Connor). Id. at 1891. Notice, again, the interesting split
of the previously designated ideological camps of the Rehnquist Court.
178. See e.g. id. at 1907 (Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
179. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1908. Justice Brandeis participated in the debates leading to the Amendment
and stated, in part:
"The plaintiffs ask us to limit [section 2's] broad command. They request us to construe the
Amendment as saying, in effect: The State may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors
provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within its borders; but if it permits such manufacture
and sale, it must let imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal terms. To say that, would
involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a rewriting of it .. "
Id. (quoting St. Bd of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936)).
180. Id. at 1910 (Thomas, Stevens, O'Connor, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Title 27, section 122 of the
U.S. Code, which Justice Thomas explained in his dissent, "'prevent[s] the immunity characteristic of interstate
commerce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor through such commerce in States contrary to their
laws."' Id. (quoting Clark DistillingCo. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311,324 (1917)) (bracket in original).
181. Id. at 1908 n. 2 (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 338 (1964)
(Black & Goldberg, JJ., dissenting)) (Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1891.
183. See id. at 1898.
184. Id. at 1900.
185. Id. at 1903 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R., 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (upholding First Amendment,
commercial free speech); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (upholding the Establishment
Clause)).
186. 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).
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compliance with state law. 187 One has to wonder what has become of the Rehnquist
Court's restrictive approach to Congressional Commerce Clause authority and its
expansive and deferential approach to states' rights.
B.

Eminent Domain
In San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco,18 8 the Supreme

Court avoided a takings issue, 1 89 which it held was barred by the doctrine of issue
preclusion.190 The issue had been resolved in state court,-by the Full Faith and Credit

Act 19 1-which

afforded no exception for claims raising a takings issue under the Fifth

Amendment. 192
The takings issue was also raised in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 19 3 In Lingle,

the Court clarified the meaning and coverage of a rule developed through case law,
beginning with its enunciation in Agins v. City of Tiburon.19 4 In Agins, the Court held

that

"'

[tjhe application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if

the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an
19 5
owner economically viable use of his land.'
The "substantially advances" language, appearing, as it does, in the disjunctive, led

196
credence to the view that it was an independent test for detecting a regulatory takings.

Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, adamantly rejected that view. 19 7

Rather, she

stated, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment triggers the mandate of just

199
compensation1 98 whenever the government directly appropriates private property.

But it also embraces certain regulatory impositions on the use of private property, as per

187. Id. at 2199, 2201; see also Stephen K. Balman, ConstitutionalIrony. Gonzales v. Raich, Federalism
and Congressional Regulation of Intrastate Activities under the Commerce Clause, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 125
(2005).
188. 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005).
189. See id at 2506 (citing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
190. Id. at 2499-500.
191. Id. at 2500 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738) ("This statute has long been understood to encompass the
doctrines of res judicata, or 'claim preclusion' and collateral estoppel, or 'issue preclusion."').
192. Id. at 2501-02. Here, the Court refused to create an exception to Full Faith and Credit requirements for
takings issues and distinguishing England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964). The Court decided that England involved
federal constitutional challenges to a state statute that can be avoided if a state court construes the
statute in a particular manner.... [T]he purpose of Pullman abstention in such cases is to avoid
resolving the federal question by encouraging a state-law determination that may moot the federal
controversy.
San Remo Hotel, 125 S. Ct. at 2502 (footnote omitted). The instant case, the Court held, was inapposite
because the petitioners included their various claims for takings violations in their state action. Id. at 2503.
193. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
194. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
195. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2082 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (bracket in original, emphasis added,
citations omitted).
196. Id. at 2083-84.
197. Id.at 2084.
198. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Clause applicable to the states as well as to the federal
government. Id.at 2080.
199. Id.at 2081 (citing U.S. v. Pewee Coal Co., Inc., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (upholding the seizure of private
coal mines)).
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se takings, under two situations: 20 0 "First, where government requires an owner to suffer
a permanent physical invasion of her property-however minor-" ;201 and, second,
where the regulations "completely deprive an owner of 'all economically beneficial
us[e]' of her property. ' 2° 2 And, then, beyond these two categorical per se takings by
way of government regulation, other regulations are evaluated by the factors considered
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,20 3 and developed in recent
cases, like Dolan v. City of Tigard204 and Nollan v.California Coastal Commission.2 05
Justice O'Connor identified the Penn Central factors for evaluating regulatory takings to
include: "economic impact," i.e., "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations"; and "character of the government action," i.e.,
physical invasion or restrictions on use through "some public program adjusting the
20 6
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."
It is notable that most of the Court's doctrinal development of regulatory (as
opposed to physical) takings has occurred during the Rehnquist Court era. While the
Agins Court decision pre-dated, what we think of as the core years of the Rehnquist
Court, as Justice O'Connor also points out, Agins was the first case to address a zoning
regulation in decades and, she added, it is "understandable 20 7 that the Court reached
back to precedents dealing with zoning regulation. 20 8 Those precedents, 20 9 however,
were premised upon due process considerations, not takings jurisprudence and, to that
extent, Agins developed a due process approach that is "regrettably imprecise '2 1° and
seems inappropriately to "commingl[e]", 2 11 due process analysis with takings
analysis. 2 12 Thus, the Agins test must be eliminated from takings analysis: "[S]uch a test
is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been 'taken' for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. '2 13 Not only is the Agins "substantially advances"
approach doctrinally inappropriate in a takings analysis, which "pre-supposes that the
government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose,' 2 14 but the Agins formula
would cast the courts in the improper role of second guessing the legislature as it did in

200. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081. The inclusion of regulation of the use of private property as a possible
category of "takings" was noted in the seminal case of PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
See id. at 2081.
201. Id.at 2081 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
202. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)) (emphasis in original, bracket in
original).
203. Id.
at 2081-82 (citing 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
204. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
205. Id. (citing 483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
206. Id.
at 2081-82 (quoting Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Id. at 2083.
208. Id.
209. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2083 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), as historic due process precedents upon which Agins
erroneously relied).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2084.
214. Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2084.
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the instant case, Lingle.2 15 In Lingle, Chevron argued that Hawaii's rent cap statute
failed the Agins substantially advances test (the rent cap did not advance a legitimate
state interest), and experts weighed in on both sides of that issue. 2 16 Holding that the
Agins analysis was invalid in a takings case, the Court reversed and remanded. 2 17
Without question, the most well-publicized takings decision last Term (and the
case that inspired the strongest-mostly negative-public response) was Kelo v. City of
New London.218 At issue was a problem reminiscent of Agins concerns: The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation." 2 19 The pivotal and undisputed facts
in the case were that pursuant to a comprehensive revitalization program, the City
condemned ninety acres of privately-held residential property, and that many (perhaps
all) of the parcels condemned were in good repair. 220 The approval of the program in
2000, however, came after Pfizer, Inc., in 1998, announced the forthcoming construction
of"a global research facility." 2 2 1 The non-profit corporation hired by the City to prepare
the plan announced that the parcels would be condemned "in order to complement the
[Pfizer facility], create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to
and use of the city's waterfront, and eventually 'build momentum' for the revitalization
of the rest of the city.'222 The development program called for the construction of
buildings for various types of commercial enterprise, including a hotel, restaurants,
shops, and office space which would be leased to private developers under long-term
leases. 223 A deeply divided Court upheld the program against a challenge that it violated
the Takings Clause because it was not for "public use. '224 Specifically, the question
was: "Are economic development takings constitutional? '225 The majority opinion,
authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
226
Kennedy (who also filed a concurrence), said that they could be, and were in this case.
Two dissents said they were not.227 Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, 228 while Justice
229
Thomas also filed a separate dissent.

215. See id.
at 2085.
216. Id.at 2084-85.
217. Id.at 2087.
218. 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
219. U.S. Const. amend. V (cited in Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 n. I (emphasis added)).
220. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659-62, 2660 ("There is no allegation that any of these properties is blighted or
otherwise in poor condition.").
221. Id.at 2671 (O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
222. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
223. Id.at 2659-60 (majority).
224. Id.at 2668-69.
225. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Surprisingly,
this was a question of first impression for the Court. Id.
226. Id.at 2658, 2668 (majority).
227. Id. at 2674, 2677 (O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id.at 2677 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
228. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
229. Id.at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Because the substance of the arguments developed in each of those opinions falls
within the purview of Professor Marla Mansfield's paper in this symposium, 23 0 I will not
explore them in any depth here. Nonetheless, for purposes of this article's thesis, these
arguments are notable in several respects. First, to resurrect and redirect (then) Justice
Rehnquist's famous aside in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,23 1 the ideological camps of the Court in Kelo seem to "'[change]
positions as nimbly as if dancing a quadrille.' 2 32 The majority opinion of the
liberal-leaning camp on the Court buttressed its conclusions by arguments premised on
federalism, 233 judicial restraint2 34 and, of course, selected precedent. 235 While the
dissenting opinions, supported by the conservative-leaning camp on the Court, rested
their views on appeals to a species of judicial activism and the kinds of arguments that
23 6
are launched to legitimize it (along with, of course, other selected precedents).
One unfortunate aspect of the case was that the issue, as drafted, posed an
237
unnecessary dichotomy: "Are economic development takings [ever] constitutional?"
This calls, ineluctably, for a bright line rule. A better, more doctrinally-useful, rendition
of the legal dispute in Kelo would be to cast the issue as an inquiry into whether the
economic development takings described in the record of this case were constitutional.
Nonetheless, I believe that as between two strong analyses of the issue, as it was
presented in Kelo, Justice O'Connor's argument was more persuasive. When a takings
primarily benefits private enterprise and may only confer incidental benefits (if any) on
the public, then eminent domain has not been invoked for "public use." Justice Stevens,
who subsequently acknowledged that he was reluctant to rule as he did but felt
compelled to do so, 238 described a way around his ruling 239 which, following a firestorm

230. Maria E. Mansfield, Takings and Threes: The Supreme Court's 2004-2005 Term, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 243
(2005).
231. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
232. Id. at 540 (quoting Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87 (1953)) (footnote omitted). See Bucholtz,
Gestalt Flips,supra n. II (discussing how the conservative camp of the Rehnquist Court dramatically "flipped"
its position on its (still) emergent federalism doctrine and interjected itself into the Florida presidential election
process).
233. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664 ("Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme of federalism,
emphasizing the 'great respect' that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public
needs.").
234. Id. at 2668 ("This Court's authority, however, extends only to determining whether the City's proposed
condemnations are for a 'public use' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.").
235. See id. at 2666 n. 14.
236. Id. at 2673 ("An external, judicial check on how the public use requirement is interpreted, however
limited, is necessary if this constraint on government power is to retain any meaning.") (O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2677 (stating the majority's deference in this case to local
government is "an abdication of our responsibility"); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673-74 (O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 2673.
238. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), 154 N.Y. Times Al (Aug. 25,
2005). This article reported that Justice Stevens believed two opinions he authored last Term were compelled
but unwise. "The outcomes were 'unwise,' he said, but 'in each I was convinced that the law compelled a
result that I would have opposed if I were a legislator."' Id. With respect to Kelo, he said his decision was
"'entirely divorced from my judgment concerning the wisdom of the program' that was under constitutional
attack." Id. The other opinion that Justice Stevens alluded to as being unwise but compelled was the medical
marijuana case. Id.; id at A16.
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of headline-grabbing outrage, the public seems to have embraced. 240 And, finally, Kelo
serves as additional evidence that ideological doctrine is being destabilized at the end of
the Rehnquist era, leaving us with some uncertainty, as Professor Tribe has commented,
about what direction our jurisprudence is headed. But this destabilization can also mean
that a new consensus is in the works. A consensus that rests not on an ideological and
unproductive split on the Court, but one built upon well-reasoned arguments in which all
maxims and canons of constitutional and statutory construction are in play. But the
legitimacy of a particular interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision would
reside in its ability to persuade us that this is the best interpretation under all the
circumstances. Thus, interpretive devices like "original intent," "plain meaning," and
'Judicial restraint," could not claim infallible powers of legitimacy. Rather, they would
simply assume their proper place as three guiding principles among many others which
can be employed in reaching a decision. As Justice Stevens has said, judges are
constrained when they "make [themselves]
accountable to all reliable evidence of
24 1
legislative [or Constitutional] intent."
XI.

CONCLUSION

The final Term of the Rehnquist Court was a fascinating one. For cases affecting
business interests directly it was "business as usual": a moderately pro-business Court.
From a broader perspective, it is difficult to say what the Term portends. Perhaps the
ideological split that appeared during the Rehnquist years will continue, even deepen.
But, given the destabilization of the majority's own doctrine in the final years of the
Rehnquist era (as illustrated, in part, by this final Term), there is reason to believe that a
new, more inclusive and pragmatic (and, therefore more stable) consensus is in the
offing. Or, to paraphrase Grant Gilmore's vision at the end of his monumental The
Death of Contract:
We have gone through our romantic agony-an experience peculiarly unsettling to people
intellectually trained and conditioned as lawyers are. It may be that ...
some new
[consensus] is already waiting in the wings to summon us back to the paths of

239. Toward the end of his opinion, Justice Stevens wrote:

We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on
its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose "public use" requirements
that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been established as a
matter of state constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that
carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised.... [In any case] the necessity
and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic development are certainly matters of
legitimate public debate.

Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2668 (footnotes omitted).
240. The public response was dramatic. See e.g. Judy Coleman, Protests Against Eminent Domain Involve
Trust, Tulsa World G3 (Oct. 16, 2005); House, Senate Lawmakers Begin to Push to Circumvent Eminent
Domain Decision, 74 U.S. L. Week (BNA) 2008 (July 5, 2005); Marie Price, Eminent Domain Puts
Lawmakers on a Tightrope, Tulsa World All (Aug. 26, 2005); Marie Price, Property Owners Heard on
Eminent Domain Process, Tulsa World A7 (Aug. 24, 2005); Marie Price, Task Force to Review Eminent
Domain in State, Tulsa World A 15 (July 17, 2005); World Capitol Bureau, CapitolRoundup: Bills to Protect
PropertyPlanned,Tulsa World A9 (June 28, 2005).
241. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 463 n. 1)

(Stevens, Breyer, JJ., concurring) (emphasis in original); see supran. 170 and accompanying text.
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righteousness, discipline, order, and well-articulated 242
theory.
ended] but who knows what [the new Term may bring]?

241

[The Rehnquist era has

242. Gilmore, supra n. 2, at 103.
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